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As of the 1990 amendment, all Missouri point source dischargers had
to pay a $1,500 annual fee to obtain a permit.
The circuit court found that the state required the permit fee, and
that because the fee is a requirement of Missouri State law, it must
conform to the Missouri Constitution. Thus, the question before the
court was whether the state had decreased its proportion of funding
for administration of its discharge permit program, resulting in a permit fee that violated the state constitution.
The court found that the state never funded all water pollution
regulation costs, but that the filing fees paid by municipalities subsidized some of those costs. Applying a previous Missouri Supreme
Court ruling, the court held that the state could lawfully increase fees
if the state continued to fund the costs of administering state water
pollution laws in the same proportion it did at the time of the Hancock Amendment's passage. Because the trial record did not provide
enough evidence for the court to decide whether the amendment unlawfully decreased the state proportion, the court reversed the district
court's ruling, and remanded for such a determination. The court
also reversed the district court's ruling ordering the state to issue Glasgow a permit, and remanded for issuance of an order declaring Glasgow in violation of federal law and enjoining the city from discharging
sludge into the river.
Debbie Eiland

FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT
OREGON
Umatilla Waterquality Protective Ass'n, Inc. v. Smith Frozen Foods,
Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1312 (D. Or. 1997) (holding groundwater not subject to a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit under the Clean Water Act).
Plaintiff, Umatilla Waterquality Protective Association ("UWQPA"),
is a nonprofit corporation composed of approximately twelve individuals whose goal is to protect the quality of water in several Oregon
counties. Members of UWQPA owned property or lived near the
Smith Frozen Foods operation on Pine Creek in Weston, Oregon.
Plaintiff alleged that the wastewater pipelines sometimes discharged
pollutants into the creek, which interfered with aesthetic enjoyment
and water recreation in the area. Plaintiff also alleged that chemicals
from Smith's old brine lagoon were leaching into the groundwater and
then traveling to the creek, constituting an unpermitted continuous
discharge of pollutants into the creek.
Both parties stipulated to three issues. First, whether the federal
Clean Water Act ("CWA") applied to pollutants discharged into
groundwater that is hydrologically connected to navigable waters.

Issue I

COURT REPORTS

Second, whether under the CWA, the unlined brine pond constituted
a point source. Finally, whether this type of pollutant discharge was
within the scope of federal Clean Water Act citizen suitjurisdiction.
The court concluded that all groundwater, including groundwater
hydrologically connected to surface water, was not subject to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permitting
program. The legislative history indicated that Congress did not intend to regulate groundwater when it enacted the CWA. The CWA
states explicitly when it applies to groundwater, and clearly differentiates "navigable waters" from "ground waters." Furthermore, the EPA
has not formally interpreted the CWA to include groundwater.
In addition, the court recognized a practical consequence to subjecting groundwater to the NPDES permit system. Oregon law requires a specific permit for discharges into groundwater that is different than an NDPES permit. Thus, the court was concerned that
people would be subject to increased liability if they misjudged the
type of permit they needed.
Although the other two issues were rendered moot after determination of the preliminary issue, the court offered resolution of these
issues so that the ninth circuit would have a full opinion to review. In
resolving the second issue, the court deemed the brine pond a point
source because it was easily identifiable as a single source discharging
pollutants.
Finally, the court determined that jurisdiction was proper in this
case. The CWA only allows citizen suit jurisdiction for current violations, not those that are in the past and from which there is no risk of
further violation. In the instant case, pollutants were no longer added
to the brine pond, yet they continued to escape from it. Thus, the
court held that because pollutants continued to reach navigable waters
there was an ongoing violation of the CWA, and therefore, jurisdiction
was proper.
Shana Smilovits

ALASKA
State of Alaska v. Marie Arnariak v. Adam Arnariak, 941 P.2d 154
(Alaska 1997) (determining that the Marine Mammals Protection Act
did not preempt state law regulating the taking of marine mammals
within the Walrus Islands State Game Sanctuary).
The Alaska Supreme Court found the federal Marine Mammals
Protection Act ("MMPA") did not preempt state regulations controlling the taking of marine mammals within a state game sanctuary. The
court found that such preemption would violate the Fifth Amendment's takings clause.
The purpose of the MMPA is to protect marine mammals to the
greatest possible extent. It seeks to prohibit the harassment, catching,

